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MEMORANDUM 
Warren Price, III, Attorney General . ~-
William M. Tam, Deputy Attorney Genera~~ 
TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: Blue Ocean Preservation Society v. Watkins, 
U.S.D.C. Civil No. 90-00407, Ezra, J. 
I 
Enclosed please find for your information, a copy of Judge 
David Ezra's June 25, 1991 opinion permanently enjoining all 
United States funding, permits, participation, and decision 
making in all activities related to the undersea geothermal 
"Project," except those activities necessary to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement or to keep informed on the 
geothermal cable "Project's" status. 
On the United States' Motion to Dismiss, Judge Ezra found 
that Senator Inouye's legislation authorizing an EIS with 
previously appropriated federal funds did not "moot" the case 
and, therefore, the suit could not be dismissed. On the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Justice Department 
did not even file a memorandum in opposition. The judge 
granted the motion summarily. 
Special attention should be given to footnote 7 on page 21 
which intimates that in the case of a "cooperate federal-state 
enterprise," there is authority suggesting that "all activity 
may be enjoined pending preparation of an adequate EIS." 
(emphasis added). In short, even non-parties like the State 
could be barred from work on geothermal cable related 
activities until the EIS is completed. 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect the Pele Defense Fund 
will attempt to use this Order in State court to enjoin 
Campbell's activities on the theory that Campbell's work is 
"cable related," even though Campbell has State permits with 
limited exploration and development rights which have already 
been subject to judicial .review. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII 
JUN L5 II 14 Hil '31 
BLUE OCEAN PRESERVATION 
SOCIETY, a Hawaii non-profit 
corporation; SIERRA CLUB, a 
California non-profit 
corporation; GREENPEACE 
FOUNDATION, a Hawaii non-
profit corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES D. WATKINS, Secretary, 
Department of Energy, et al., 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________________________ ) 
CIVIL NO. 90-00407 DAE 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTER MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE AS MOOT 
I. Introduction 
This lawsuit seeks to compel preparation of a federal 
Environmental Impact Statement ("E~:S"> for the Hawaii Geot.termal 
-. 
Energy Project (the "Project") and to enjoin any further federal 
< 
participation in the Project until the EIS is completed. Last 
January on plaintiffs' and defendants' (or the "government"'s) 
motions for summary judgment, the court ruled that the remaining 
phases of the project constitute "major federal action" within 
the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Responding to the government's 
contention that the matter was not yet ripe, the court also ruled 
that there remained issues of fact (1) as to the Department of 
1 . 
Hawaii~ It involves four distinct stages or phases leading to 
the private development of a 500 megawatt geothermal power plant 
on the slopes of -the Kilauea crater, an active volcano on the 
Island of Hawaii. The first two phases, involving {1) the 
building of a small plant for research and testing, and (2) 
research regarding the feasibility of transporting the power 
generated to other islands via underwat~r cable, have already 
been completed, and any attempt to obtain an EIS for those phases 
was deemed moot. January 8 Order, 754 F. Supp. at 1459. Phase 
III, entitled the Geothermal Resource Verification and Character-
ization Program, is now in progress, and involves the drilling of 
twenty-five (25) commercial-scale exploration wells throughout 
the Kilauea East Rift Zone in order to "verify" the geothermal 
resource. This verification will clear the way for Phase IV, the 
construction of the full 500 megawatt project. 
Phase III is proceeding with funds appropriated by the 
Hawaii state legislature. So far, at least two slim~pore 
scientific observation holes ("SOHs") have been drilled, and four 
more are called for. It is anticipated that federal funds will 
be utilized to drill the 25 full-scale holes in areas "proven" by 
the SOH drilling. 
Phase IV will involve the construction of up to twenty 
(20) separate geothermal power plants of about 25 megawatts 
apiece. Each of these will employ eight to ten working wells. 
The separate plants will necessarily be connected by a network of 
roads, plumbing, and power lines throughout the subzone areas. 
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Unable to determine the validity of this claim on the evidence 
before it, the court determined that issues of fact remained as 
to (1) DOE's level of commitment to the implementation of Phase 
III, and (2) DOE's role with respect to the $5 million 
appropriation. 754 F. Supp. at 1465-66. 
1. DOE's Reprogramming Request 
After this court ruled that the government's partici-
pation in the Project constituted "major federal action" based 
largely on the $5 million appropriation, DOE sought to 
"reprogram" the money, and have it applied to another project. 
When DOE announced its intention to seek reprogramming at a 
pretrial conference on February 12, 1991, the court granted a 
continuance with the concurrence of all parties of the February 
trial date in order to permit DOE and Congress to settle the 
status of the funding. 
Plaintiffs conducted some discovery on this repro-
gramming process, and obtained a single document· from DOE: an 
internal memorandum dated December 1, 1986, detailing DOE's 
reprogramming procedure (the "Memo", Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). The 
Memo explicitly acknowledges that an agency is expressly for-
bidden from spending a Congressional appropriation for purposes 
other than those for which they were appropriated. 31 u.s.c. 
§ 1301(a). 
The Memo goes on to explain, however, that repro-
gramming may be sought by first clearing the request with the 
Office of Management and Budget, and then submitting it to the 
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DOE had made it clear that its primary concern in 
seeking the reprogramming was this very lawsuit, and the 
"possible precedent-setting outcome of the lawsuit requiring 
Federal preparation of such an EIS." Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. In 
order to accommodate this concern about legal precedent, the 
language approved by the Conference Committee explicitly states 
that Phase III 
is research work not development or project 
construction work and is not a "major federal 
action" and therefore would not require an 
EIS pursuant to the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA). However, the environ-
mental sensitivity of this geothermal 
resource is so acute that the process 
required in an EIS is important, and shall be 
complied with in this case. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13. By employing this language, the 
government attempted to avoid acknowledging any legal obligation 
to conduct an EIS. 
Notwithstanding the Conference Report's character-
ization of Phase III as "research work" that ·does not constitute 
11major federal action," the facts and law cannot support such a 
characterization. As noted in the January 8 Order, Phases III 
and IV are "connected actions" under NEPA regulations and must be 
made the subject of a single EIS. 754 F. Supp. 1459. Moreover, 
the 11 research work" contemplated by Phase III alone easily 
satisfies the statutory standards for 11major federal action 11 
based simply on the exten~ of federal funding. Id. at 1466-67. 
The characterization of Phase III as 11 research work not 
development or project construction work" does not speak to the 
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In support of its argument, the government cites a 
series of cases defining mootness: S.E.C. v. Medical Committee 
for - Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1~72) (there must Qe -an 
actual case or controversy); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 
459 n.10 (1974) (the controversy must exist at all stages of 
review) ; Allard v. DeLorean, 884 F. 2d 4 64, 4 66 (9th Cir. 1989) (a 
case becomes moot when it loses its character as a live contro-
versy) ; Garcia v. Lawn, 805 F. 2d 14 00, 14 02 (9th Cir. 1986) (a 
case is moot if there is no meaningful relief available to 
plaintiffs). Its argument is that plaintiffs will get their EIS 
in any case, that the need for an EIS therefor~ is no -longer a 
live issue because there is no meaningful relief the court can 
order beyond what the defendant DOE has suggested it will 
provide. 
B. The Plaintiffs' Response to the Mootness Argument 
1. The Illusory Nature of DOE's Promises 
Plaintiffs, however, take litt~e comfort in DOE's 
"decision" to perform an EIS and DOE's "promise" to withhold any 
participation in the Project until the EIS is complete. The 
record in this case supports plaintiffs' concerns. Most 
disturbing is the acute possibility that DOE may yet again change 
its mind or renege on its stated intent. Plaintiffs note that 
DOE has in fact changed its position several times already in an 
attempt to avoid adjudication in this case. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
6 and 8. This gives rise to serious questions regarding the 
immutability of DOE's decision and promise. 
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Pointing out these shortcomings in the government's promises, 
plaintiffs argue that such "illusory and n6nspecific" promises 
cannot render the case moot. Plaintiffs' Reply M_emorandu~ at 10. 
3. Application of the Mootness Doctrine 
The burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy one. 
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Gordon, 849 -F.2d 1241, 
1244 (9th Cir. 1988). The question of mootness "'is not whether 
the precise relief sought at the time the application for an 
injunction was filed is still available. The question is whether 
there can be any effective relief.'" Gordon, 849 F.2d at 1244-45 
(quoting Garcia v. Lawn, 805 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(emphasis provided in Gordon)). 
This is not a case in which the government has already 
prepared an EIS, or even commenced such preparation. 3 Plain-
tiffs cite numerous cases for the proposition that a suit to 
compel future action is moot only dfter it has been "fully and 
irrevocably carried out." ~' University of Texas v. 
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 398 (1981). To the court, this seems 
axiomatic. Accordingly, a suit to compel an EIS is rendered moot 
when the EIS is completed and filed. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 
643 F.2d 835, 862 (1st Cir. 1981); City of Newport Beach v. Civil 
Aeronautics Board, 665 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Upper Pecos 
Association v. Stans, 500 F.2d 17 (lOth Cir. 1974). Here, of 
3EIS preparation commences with the publication of a notice in 
the Federal Register, as required by 40 C.P.R. § 1501.7. To date, 
no such publication has occurred. 
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4. The "Voluntary Cessation" Exception to the 
Mootness Doctrine 
Even if DOE's promises were sufficient to deprive the 
court of jurisdiction under traditional --noti ons of- mootiless-, 
these facts fall squarely within a well-established exception to 
the mootness doctrine: "the voluntary cessation of allegedly 
illegal conduct." United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 
632 {1953), quoted in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 
625, 631 {1979). 
The u.s. Supreme Court has recognized that, as a 
general rule, such voluntary cessation will not deprive the court 
of jurisdiction. Id.; see also Arrnster v. United States District 
Court, 806 F.2d 1347, 1357 (9th Cir. 1986) ("a change of activity 
by a defendant under the threat of judicial scrutiny is 
insufficient to negate the existence of an otherwise ripe case or 
controversy"). The "voluntary cessation" exception is rooted in 
the policy that a party should not be able to insulate itself 
from any challenge to its illegal conduct simply by suspending 
the illegal activity whenever a legal action is brought; 
otherwise there would be no check on that party's resumption of 
the conduct after dismissal of the legal action. Accordingly, in 
such cases, the matter can be deemed moot only if (1) "'there is . 
no reasonable expectation • • ' that the alleged violation will 
recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and 
irrevocably eradicated the effe.cts of the alleged violation." 
Davis, 440 U.S. at 631 (quoting Grant, 345 U.S . at 633) (other 
citations omitted). 
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3 7 , 4 3 , 6 5 S . Ct . 11 , 14 , 8 9 L. Ed • 2 9 ( 19 4 4 ) 
(defendant's decision to cease offering 
allegedly illegal contract terms two months 
after complaint was filed but be~ore tria~ 
did not moot controversy where ..defendant _ 
failed to acknowledge illegality of conduct). 
See also Alton & Southern Railway v. _ 
International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, 463 F.2d 872, 879 n.13 
(D.C._ Cir. 1972)_ ("a deliberate and 
persistent official interpretation is more 
likely to identify a 'recurring controversy' 
situation"). • 
Arrnster, 806 F.2d at 1359-60 (footnote omitted). As already 
noted, the government has consistently claimed that it has no 
legal duty to prepare an EIS. It purports to be doing an EIS now 
only because it chooses to, based on a "nonbinding" Congressional 
suggestion. 
c. Conclusion 
Based upon DOE's past conduct in this case there is no 
valid reason to assume DOE may not yet change its position 
further. The court therefore holds that the case cannot be 
rendered moot based on DOE · s asserted intent. Even more 
compelling is the government's failure to give any assurances 
regarding (1) the timing of the promised EIS, (2) the continued 
participation of the other non-DOE defendants in the Project, and 
(3) the continued involvement of all defendants in the Project in 
advisory and permitting roles. Finally, the court finds that 
even if the case might otherwise be deemed moot, it is clearly 
within the "voluntary cessation" exception, and should not be 
dismissed short of a full adjudication on the merits. 
15 
B. The Merits of the Motion 
Section 102 ( 2) (C) of NEPA requires _federal agencies to 
prepare and file an EIS before -undertaking _ "ma.jer federal--action 
-- - - - - -
-
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 
42 u.s.c. § 4332(2) (C). The court determined, in _its January 8 
Order, that Phases III and IV constitute "major federal action" 
within the meaning of the statute, based on the $5 million 
already appropriated to it, as well as the substantial overall 
federal funding and active participation in the Project. 754 
F. Supp. at 1466-67. Because DOE's reprogramming effort failed, 
and the $5 million appropriation survives, there is no basis for 
revisiting that issue. 
1. Ripeness 
In the January 8 Order, however, the court found issues 
of fact relating to the question of ripeness. 754 F. Supp. at 
1465-66. Specifically, because DOE claimed that it was not 
necessarily committed to the Project, and because DOE professed 
to have power to divert the appropriation to other uses, it was 
not clear that the time was ripe to compel an EIS. Given the 
developments of the last six months, however, the uncertainty has 
evaporated. DOE's attempt to reprogram .. the money failed. It is 
this court's view that notwithstanding the government's attempt 
to argue otherwise, see footnote 2 supra, .. DOE is required to use 
the money as directed by Congress. 31 u.s.c. § 130l(a) 
("Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which 
the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by 
17 
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the human environment." Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 
F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original) (if such 
substantial quest~ons-are ra_ised, _"a _decision no~ to prepare an 
-
EIS is unreasonable"); Foundation for North American -wild Sheep 
v. u.s. Dept. of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 
1982) . 
The evidentiary ·offering on this issue is entirely 
uncontroverted. As indicated, to carry their burden of proof 
plaintiffs need only raise questions about whether the Project 
may significantly affect the environment. The court is satisfied 
that this burden .has been met many times over in the series of 
expert witness affidavits, scientific reports, illustrative maps, 
correspondence and other documents filed by plaintiffs with their 
motion. 
b. The Evidence Offered to Show "Significance" 
The land-based aspect of the Project itself 
contemplates a network of geothermal plants, wells, power lines, 
roads and pipes over 26,000 acres, many of them located in the 
Wao Kele o Puna forest. In 1981, then Governor Ariyoshi formally 
designated the Wao Kele 0 Puna forest a Natural Area Reserve, in 
recognition of its importance as "an environmental and natural 
heritage site" as well as a "research site" that would "preserve 
a gene pool of native plant and animal species, particularly of 
rare and endangered species." Plaintiffs' Exhibit 26 at 2-4. 
This Natural Area Reserve designation was later revoked in a 
19 
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impressed that by any measure, plaintiffs have met their burden, 
and that the P~oject is one _that may significantly affect the 
~ quality of the human environment -; 
C. Conclusion 
Having demonstrated "major federal action" in the 
previous hearing, ~ 754 F. Supp. 1450, and now having estab-
lished ripeness and "significance," plal~tiffs have proven their 
case on the merits. Accordingly, they are entitled to summary 
judgment. 
V. Motion for an Injunction on Federal Participation Until the 
EIS is Complete 
In addition to the injunction ordering the immediate 
preparation of an EIS, to which plaintiffs are entitled by virtue 
of the summary judgment hereby granted, plaintiffs seek an 
injunction barring any further federal participation in the 
Projec~ until that EIS is completed. 7 The court finds that 
because plaintiffs have already prevailed in their action, there 
is no point in engaging in the typical "preliminary injunction" 
analysis. See, ~' United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-
7It is noteworthy that Plaintiffs seek to enJ o1.n only the 
federal participation in the Project. There is authority 
suggesting that in a case such as this one, where the challenged 
action is a cooperate federal-state enterprise, all activity may be 
enjoined pending preparation of an adequate EIS. Biderrnan v. 
Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1974) ("It is well settled 
that non-federal parties may be enjoined, pending completion of an 
EIS, where those non-federal entities have entered into a 
partnership or joint venture with the Federal Government, and are 
thus recipients of federal funding"); see also Dalsis v. Hills, 424 
F.Supp. 784, 787 (W.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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754 F. Supp. at 1461. 
If these purposes of NEPA are to be served, no further 
federal resources may be CollllTfi tted_ to the- Project until the EIS 
is completed. If the E~S is to play any role at all in the 
decisionmaking process, if the serious environmental concerns 
raised in this case are to be given any weight at all in the 
- t 
planning and fashioning of this Project, all federal participa-
tion in the Project itself, with the exception of work and 
funding necessary to accomplish the preparation of an EIS, must 
be suspended until that EIS can be prepared and filed. 
Federal "participation" is defined for purposes of this 
order to include any decisionmaking or facilitating role in the 
Project. The government may not fund the Project, process permit 
applications or issue permits, or participate in interagency 
meetings in such a way as to further the development of the 
Project. The bar on federal participation will not, however, 
prevent the government from attending interagency meetings and 
otherwise keeping itself apprised of the Project's status. 
The government has taken this Project as far as it 
possibly can without complying with NEPA. The policies embodied 
in NEPA will tolerate nothing short of an absolute bar on further 
federal participation, as defined herein, in the Project until 
NEPA is complied with. 
23 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTJMI j) F~~ 
L'"t~:l~ STAleS DISTRICT COURt 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII DISTPJCT OF HAWAII 
BLUE OCEAN PRESERVATION SOCIETY, ) 
a Hawaii non-profit corporation: ) 
SIERRA CLUB, a California non- ) 
profit corporation: and ) 
GREENPEACE FOUNDATION, a Hawaii ) 
non-profit corporation, ) 
tJAN 0 6 1991 
e! i_ o'clock and~ l?a.t. 
\',',\L ~ ~J-l. CHINN. ~RK 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) 
) 
JAMES D. WATKINS, Secretary ) 
Department of Energy: et al., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
____________________________ ) 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT UNITED STATES' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. Introduction 
......... ' 
rn 
This is an action brought by three environmental groups 
(•Plaintiffs•) seeking to compel the federal government to prepare 
an Environmental Impact Statement (•EIS•) covering the development 
of geothermal energy on the Island of Hawaii (the •aig Island•) 
before proceeding further with that development. Defendant federal 
departments and agencies (collectively the •Government•) have moved 
for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claim is not 
ripe, and that this court therefore lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the geothermal project 
\t 
constitutes •major federal action• within the meaning of 42 u.s.c. : 
5 4332(2)(C). This motion presents a major question for resolution 
in this action. 
II. Factual Background 
A. The 4-Phase Hawaii Geothermal Project 
In 1978, in order to encourage the commercial development of 
geothermal energy, the State of Hawaii, with the cooperation of 
Congress and the Department of Energy, began the Hawaii Geothermal 
Project (the •Project•). It was envisioned that the Project would 
be carried out in four stages: (1) the Hawaii Geothermal Resource 
Assessment Program (•Phase I•), (2) the Hawaii Deep Water Cable 
( 3) the Hawaii Geothermal Resource 
Verification and Characterization Program (•Phase III•), and (4) 
Construction of the Commercial Hawaii Geothermal Project (•Phase 
The Project was intended to provide large quantities of 
electric power, 1 generated by geothermal energy plants on the side 
of the Big Island's Kilauea volcano, and transported to the islands 
of Maui and Oahu via underwater and overland cable. The early 
phases were to be carried out primarily with public funds to remove 
the uncertainty and risk, and thereby encourage private investors 
to undertake the ultimate Project development (Phase IV). 
Phase I was jointly funded by the State of Hawaii and the u.s. 
Department of Energy (•DOE•), with the federal government 
1 The Project clearly contemplates the provision of 500 
megawatts of power (enough to meet half the power needs of the 
State of Hawaii). It is not clear from the record, however, 
whether this specific amount was projected from the beginning, or 
whether it was determined using the data gathered in Phase I. 
t .,. 
contributing $10.7 million, 80\ of the total funding. ·It resulted 
in the drilling of one geothermal well and the establishment of a 
small 2.5 megawatt demonstration plant (recently closed down) in 
the Puna district on the Big Island. Phase I provided important 
data on the geothermal resource base and has now been completed. 
Phase II, the Deep Water Cable Program, was a study of the 
feasibility of transmitting electricity via a submarine cable 
system from the Big Island to Maui and Oahu. The federal 
government provided over $24 million (83\ of total cost) for the 
research, design, construction and routing of an undersea cable. 
This included not only generic cable development research, but also 
site-specific route surveys between the islands as well as actual 
test-laying of cable on site. At-sea tests have been finished and 
this phase is essentially completed. 
In conjunction with these first two phases of the Project, the 
Hawaii legislature has enacted a series of laws designed to further 
the Project, which it terms a •federal/state partnership effort.• 
See the 1988 Act, discussed infra at Section II.B. These include 
laws granting favorable excise tax treatment to sellers of 
geothermal energy (1978-Act No. 135), designating geothermal 
subzones for development purposes (1983-Act No. 296), and granting 
agency authority to set geothermal royalty rates ( 1985-Act No. 
138). 
Phase III has now begun, with Congress having already 
appropriated $5 million of federal funds toward it. It involves 
the drilling of 25 commercial scale exploration wells throughout 
3 
the Kilauea East Rift Zone to •verify• the geothermal resource. As 
a preliminary matter in this phase, two slim-bore scientific 
observation holes have, at state (not federal) expense, already 
been drilled. Completion of Phase III will clear the way and set 
forces in motion for the private construction of the full-scale 500 
megawatt project, which is Phase IV. 2 
B. The Geothermal and Cable System Development Permitting 
Act of 1988 
In 1988, to further accelerate and facilitate the Project, the 
Hawaii legislature enacted the •Geothermal and Cable System 
Development Permitting Act• (the •1988 Act•), codified at H.R.S. SS 
1960-1, et seq. The 1988 Act is designed primarily to streamline 
the approval and permit process. 
The 1988 Act defined the Project in terms of its ultimate goal 
(Phase IV), and specifically recognized the interdependence of its 
two fundamental components: 
( 7) The fundamental interrelationship between the 
development of geothermal resources and a cable system 
and the magnitude of the cost to undertake each of these 
developments clearly indicate that neither will be 
undertaken without the firm assurance that the other also 
will be undertaken in a synchronized and coordinated 
manner to enable both developments in substance to be 
completed concurrently • • • • 
2 Hawaii Governor John Waihee, in his formal request for 
federal funding for Phase III, characterized that phase as follows: 
Mr. Chairman, we are not asking for funding for just 
another study of renewable energy technology. Our 
proposal is for a resource verification program which 
will lead immediately to a full-scale private development 
of 500 megawatts of geothermal power. 
Letter to J. Bennett Johnston, Chairman of Subcommittee on Energy 
and Water Development, June 19, 1989, p. 2. 
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H.R.S. S 1960-2 (emphasis added). 
In addition, the 1988 Act established the Interagency Group, 
a body with representatives from each agency deemed to have 
jurisdiction or permitting authority over some aspect of the 
Project. Under the statute, eight state agencies were represented 
and eight federal agencies (all of whom are named defendants) were 
invited to join the group. All eight accepted the invitation, and 
seven sent representatives to some or all of the meetings of the 
Interagency Group. 3 
The Interagency Group's mission is to consolidate and 
streamline the permitting process for the Project. The purpose is 
to overcome the daunting array of federal, state and local permits 
and processes that have discouraged potential commercial 
developers. The Group has compiled a master list of necessary 
permits, and it is expected that it will be involved in 
establishing a timetable for regulatory review, conducting 
necessary hearings, and consolidating governmental activities. 
c. The Extent of Federal Involvement in the Project 
In addition to the contribution of federal funds, and the 
arguably significant role various federal agencies and officials 
have played as part of the Interagency Group, the federal 
3 The federal members of the Interagency Group are the u.s. 
Army Corps of Engineers, u.s. Pacific Fleet, u.s. Coast Guard, u.s. 
Geological Survey, u.s. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine 
Fisheries Service, National Park Service, and Environmental 
Protection Agency (•EPA•). The EPA has been unable to provide a 
representative because of a staffing shortage in its Honolulu 
office. It has, nonetheless, requested to be kept on board in a 
non-attending capacity and to be kept apprised of matters of 
interest to the Interagency Group. 
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government has been involved in the Project in a number of other 
ways. 
As early as 1978, DOE contracted with a private consultant for 
a •oirect Use Overview for Hawaii and Total Use Scenario for Puna 
(HI). •' The purpose of the resulting report is stated in its 
Summary: 
As a means of accelerating the environmentally 
acceptable use of geothermal resources in the State of 
Hawaii, this report presents an overview of the potential 
for direct utilization (non-electric) in the state and a 
scenario for development to the year 2020 of the most 
promising prospect--Puna, on the Big Island of Hawaii. 
This document, commissioned by DOE, sets forth a series of 
recommendations for the development of geothermal energy in the 
Puna district. It has provided groundwork and guidance for much of 
the Project. 
DOE has provided planning and financial assistance in a number 
of actions aimed at driving commercial geothermal development 
forward, independent of its participation in the phases of the 
Project itself. Plaintiffs have submitted a list of 21 DOE-
sponsored reports, funded by DOE contracts, that deal specifically 
with geothermal energy development . in Hawaii. In addition, when 
the state passed legislation for the designation of resource 
subzones, DOE provided most of the funding for the necessary 
geothermal resource assessment and impact analysis. 
More recently, Patricia Port, Regional Environmental Officer 
• The report bearing this title was prepared for DOE by 
Science Application, Inc., La Jolla, California, under Contract ET-
78-C-03-1529, on January 12, 1979. 
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for the u.s. Department of Interior conducted two meetings in 
October 1989 and June 1990 with state officers and the National 
Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the u.s. 
Geological Survey. These meetings monitored progress on the Hawaii 
Geothermal Project Master Plan, and were designed to share 
information on agency concerns so the Master Plan could be adjusted 
to mitigate such concerns and facilitate expeditious 
implementation. A third such meeting was scheduled for December 
1990. 
Additionally, it appears that every federal agency named as a 
defendant in this action will have some role in permitting the 
Project when it reaches Phase IV. 
The Government's role in the Project has not gone 
unacknowledged. As already noted, in the 1988 Act, the Hawaii 
legislature described the Project as a •federal/state partnership. • 
This •partnership• characterization of the Project has been echoed 
a number of times in various contexts. 
The 1990 Proposal to Congress for funding for Phase III 
utilized the headings •HAWAII GEOTHERMAL PROJECT: A Federal-
State-Private Partnership Leading Toward Commercialization.• That 
Proposal explained that •[a] government-private-partnership is •• 
• necessary to prove the resource and allow private commercial 
development to go forward.• 
In May 1990 u.s. Senator Daniel Inouye sent a letter to one of 
his colleagues regarding the 1990 Proposal in which he stated that 
the total funding of Phase III would •be divided equally between 
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the private sector and a State and Federal government partnership. • 
(Emphasis added.) 
In January 1990, DOE held a hearing in Honolulu on •National 
Energy Strategies. • At this meeting, the Director of Hawaii's 
Department of Business and Economic Development (•DBED•) confirmed 
its request to DOE of $15 million (spread over three years in $5 
million increments) for Phase III. The Director statedz •This is 
an excellent example of government money, state and federal, being 
used in a good wayz as seed money to prepare the way for the 
private sector to do the project with reduced risk. • At this 
hearing, the state made a specific plea for DOE's continued support 
of and participation in the Project. 
This •continuation• theme is also reflected in the record. 
Governor Waihee, in letters to the House and Senate Appropriation 
Committees, requested •continuation of the federal assistance for 
the Hawaii geothermal research and development project through the 
funding of [Phase III].• Similarly, the 1989 and 1990 Proposals 
ask that •the Federal government continue its support of the Hawaii 
Geothermal Project by joining the State and private developers in 
financing [Phase III].• 
III. Summary Judgment Standards 
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the ·moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Retail Clerks Union, Local 
648 v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., 707 F. 2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983). In 
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ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this court views the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
The moving party has the initial burden of •identifying for 
the court those portions of the materials on file in the case that 
it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact.• T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 323 (1986)). If the moving 
party meets its burden, then the opposing party may not defeat a 
motion for summary judgment in the absence of any significant 
probative evidence tending to support his legal theory. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 282 (9th Cir. 
1979). The opposing party cannot stand on its pleadings, nor can 
it simply assert that it will .be able to discredit the movant's 
evidence at trial. See T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. 
There is no genuine issue of fact if the opposing party fails 
to offer evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 
There is also no issue of fact if on the record as a whole, a 
rational trier of fact could not find in favor of the non-moving 
party.· Taylor v. List, 880 P.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 
IV. Statutory Background--The National Environmental Policy Act 
( •NEPA •) 
Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare 
and file an EIS before undertaking •major federal action 
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.. 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.• 42 
u.s.c. S 4332(2) (C). In Baltimore Gas & Electric v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 462 u.s. 87, 97 (1982) the u.s. Supreme 
Court identified the twin aims of NEPA: ( 1) it obligates the 
agency •'to consider every significant aspect of the environmental 
impact of a proposed action;' and (2) •it ensures that the agency 
will inform the public that it has considered such environmental 
concerns in its decisionmaking process.• (quoting Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 
u.s. 519, 553 (1978)). NEPA does not indicate the weight that 
should be given such environmental concerns. 
that the agency take a 'hard look' at 
consequences before taking a major action.• 
u.s. at 97. 
It requires •only 
the environmental 
Baltimore Gas, 463 
This case raises issues concerning what prompts or triggers 
NEPA obligations, what is the proper scope of the EIS, and, most 
importantly at this stage in the proceedings, when an EIS is 
required and when can it be compelled by legal action. 
V. The Government's Summary Judgment Motion 
The Government has moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, 
the Government contends that the suit to compel an EIS is moot with 
respect to Phases I and II since those are completed actions, and 
that it is unripe with respect to Phases III and IV because no 
specific proposal has been advanced for either of them. 
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A fundamental issue on the Government's ripeness argument is 
whether the Project can and/or should be treated as a single 
project for NEPA purposes. The Government's ripeness arguments 
presuppose that the Project is nothing but four separate, 
independent projects, each subject to a separate NEPA analysis. 
Plaintiffs' entire lawsuit, in contrast, presupposes that the 
several phases of the Project should be aggregated and that an EIS 
should issue for the Project as a who1e. 
The characterization of the Project is critical to this 
court's inquiry because the Government's contention that 
Plaintiffs' suit for an EIS is moot with respect to Phases I and II 
and unripe with respect to Phases III and IV makes sense only if 
the four phases are properly treated as separate actions under 
NEPA. If, as Plaintiffs contend, they are merely components of one 
•major federal action,• Plaintiffs' suit to compel an EIS for that 
action is neither moot nor unripe. It would not be moot since so 
much of the Project remains to be done, and it would not be unripe 
since the Project has already been partially implemented.' 
The court finds that there is insufficient evidence in the 
record to support a finding, at summary judgment, that the Project 
is and always was a single, integrated, action with a solitary 
purpose: the construction of a 500 megawatt geothermal plant in 
Puna. It is difficult to glean from the evidence presented just 
how clearly and specifically the latter phases were defined at the 
5 See discussion of the •proposal• requirement infra at 
Section v.c.l. 
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time Phase I was proposed and implemented in 1978. Accordingly, 
there remain issues of fact as to whether the Project was and is, 
in actuality, a single project with a single goal, or whether it 
began as mere background research projects that did not ripen into 
a proposal for a full-scale geothermal energy plant until sometime 
later. This issue cannot, therefore, be resolved by summary 
judgment. 
Even accepting the Government's contention that the four 
separate phases of the Project are distinct actions, however, the 
court nonetheless finds that the Government is not entitled to 
summary judgment. The reasoning is set forth below. 
A. The Four Phases As "Connected Actions• 
Even if the four phases of the Project are considered separate 
actions triggering separate NEPA obligations, those four actions 
(or phases) are sufficiently •connected• to require that they all 
be evaluated in a single EIS. 
The regulation that governs the scope of EISa specifically 
provides for the consideration ofz 
( 1) Connected actions, which means that they are closely 
related and therefore should be discussed in the same 
impact statement. Actions are connected if theyz 
(i) Automatically trigger other actions which may 
require environmental impact statements. 
(ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are 
taken previously or simultaneously. 
(iii) Are interdependent parts of a larger action and 
depend on the larger action for their justification. 
40 CFR S 1508.2S(a). 
Although the three subsections are connected by neither •and• 
nor "or,• it appears that they should be read in the disjunctive 
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rather than the conjunctive. They are separated by periods; 
suggesting that each or any of the three criteria should be 
sufficient, standing alone, to make the actions •connected.• The 
case law interpretations of the regulation have been consistent 
with this, having treated the separate subsections as sufficient 
conditions, not necessary conditions. Hudson River Sloop 
Clearwater v. Dept. of Navy, 836 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(noting that •[o]nly subdivisions (ii) and (iii) are at issue 
here,• and then proceeding to analyze the applicability of those 
subdivisions); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1142 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (finding the actions to be connected based solely on the 
satisfaction of subdivision (iii)) (citing Save the Yaak Committee 
v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
In this case, subsection (i) clearly does not apply, 
subsection (!i)'s applicability is arguable, and subsection (iii) 
appears to contemplate these facts precisely. 
provisions will be discussed in turn. 
The latter two 
1. Connected Actions Under Subsection (ii) 
Actioru are co~d if they: 
(ij) Cannot or will not p~ unleu othu 
octioru are takoa previo~:y or nmul~IUI:y. 
40 CFR § 1508.25(a)(l). 
Under subsection (ii), it seems clear that Phase IV could 
never proceed unless Phases I-III were undertaken previously. 
Thus, subsection (ii) arguably applies. The Second Circuit has 
suggested, however, that the proper inquiry under (ii) is not 
whether the more remote action can proceed absent the more 
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immediate action, but rather whether the more immediate action can 
proceed absent the remote action.• 
In Hudson River Sloop Clearwater v. Dept. of Navy, 836 F.2d 
760 (2d Cir. 1988) 1 conservation groups sued to stop development of 
a Navy battleship homeport until the Navy filed an EIS that also 
considered the accompanying proposal for the construction of 
housing to serve the homeport. The court observedz 
With respect to subdivision ( ii) 1 the district court 
concluded that the actions in this case are connected 
because the •construction of the family housing will not 
proceed unless the operational aspects of the homeport 
are built.• We deem the issue presented, however, to be 
whether the converse is true. In other words, will the 
operational aspects of the homeport proceed without the 
construction of family housing? 
836 F. 2d at 763. Concluding that the homeport would proceed 
whether or not the housing project could be approved, the court 
ruled that, under subsection ( ii), the two actions were not 
connected. 7 
Following the Second Circuit, the issue is not whether Phase 
IV could go forward without Phases I-III, but rather whether the 
earlier Phases could go forward without Phase IV ever being 
• In this case, the immediate action is Phase III, the action 
currently being proposed. The more remote action is Phase IV. It 
is a different question to ask whether implementation of Phase III 
is a necessary precondition for Phase IV than to ask whether 
implementation of Phase rv is a necessary precondition for Phase 
III. 
7 Hudson River Sloop cites Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 
758-59 (9th Cir. 1985) as an application of subsection (ii) 1 
observing that it found connectedness where both actions are 
necessary preconditions to the other. This court believes Thomas 
is better characterized as an application of subsection (iii) , 
discussed infra. 
14 
implemented. When characterized this way, it seems clear that the 
answer is yes. Indeed, Phases I and II have already been completed 
without any guarantee that Phase IV will ultimately be implemented. 
Moreover, the actual language of subsection (ii) suggests that it 
has nQ applicability when the more remote action follows the more 
immediate actions 
Actions are connected if theys 
. . . . 
( ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions 
are taken previously or simultaneously. 
40 CFR S 1508.25(a)(1) (emphasis added). Under this 
characterization, the various phases would not be •connected 
actions• under subsection (ii). 
It is clear, however, that the two major components of the 
Project, the cable construction and the geothermal power plant 
construction, ~ necessary to each other. The 1988 Act statedz 
( 7) The fundamental interrelationship between the 
development of geothermal resources and a cable system 
and the magnitude of the cost to undertake each of these 
developments clearly indicate that neither will be 
undertaken without the firm assurance that the other also 
will be undertaken in a synchronized and coordinated 
manner to enable both developments in substance to be 
completed concurrently • • • • 
H.R.S. S 1960-2 (emp~asis added). In a sense, therefore, the work 
related to either of those components •will not proceed• unless 
there is development of the other component. This argument, 
somewhat strained under the language of subsection (ii), is more 
squarely advanced as an application of subsection (iii), infra. 
2. Connected Actions Under Subsection (iii) 
Actioru art conmcted if they: 
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(iii) Art intuckpemknt par'U of a larger action 
and ckpend on 1M larger action for their jcutification. 
40 CFR f 1508.25(aX1). 
This provision describes the facts before the court 
accurately. Phases I-III appear to have been conceived for the 
sole purpose of bringing about Phase IV, and depend on Phase IV and 
each other for their justification. 
Although the Ninth Circuit has never explicitly relied on 
subsection (iii) in finding actions to be connected for NEPA 
purposes, it has repeatedly applied a virtually identical standard. 
It has, for example, specifically defined the interdependence that 
must exist between the various phases of a larger project if they 
are to be deemed connected: 
The dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at 
least unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent 
phases were not also undertaken. 
Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 719-20 (9th Cir. 
1988) (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th 
Cir. 1974)). The standard has been alternatively stated (as 
applied to a highway project) as follows: 
[T]he environmental impacts of a single highway segment 
may be evaluated separately from those of the rest of the 
highway only if the segment has •independent utility.• 
Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985) (summarizing 
the holding of Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1974)); 
see also Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1242 (5th Cir. 
1985) (•'Connected actions' are defined in a manner consistent with 
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the criteria recognized in the independent-utility cases.•). 1 
The Ninth Circuit elaborated on the application of this 
•independent utility• test in Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d at 759-
60a 
In the light of Trout Unlimited, the phrase windependent 
utility• means utility such that the agency might 
reasonably consider constructing only the segment in 
question. 
In Thomas, there were two proposals: one for timber harvesting and 
sales, and another for construction of a road into the area to be 
harvested. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the harvesting 
could not be done without construction of the road, and because the 
road did not have any significant utility other than to facilitate 
the harvesting, NEPA required a single EIS covering both the road 
and the timber sales. Id.; see also Morgan v. Walter, 728 F.Supp. 
1483, 1493 (D. Idaho 1989) (David A. Ezra, District Judge) 
(Proposed diversion of river and proposed fish propagation facility 
are •connected actions • because •the fish propagation facility 
could not exist absent a diversionw and because the diversion was 
proposed for the purpose of facilitating fish propagation.). 
On the facts before this court, Phases I-III do not possess 
any real independent utility. If Phase IV were not a possibility, 
1 The Second Circuit has affirmatively acknowledged that this 
•independent utility• test is merely an application of subsection 
(iii). See~ Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1141-
42 (2d Cir. 1988) (•The proper test to determine relatedness under 
40 CFR Sl508.25(a)(1)(iii) is whether the project has independent 
utility.•); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater v. Dept. of Navy, 836 
F.2d 760, 764 (2d Cir. 1988) ( •[S]ubdivision (iii) has been 
determined to mirror a line of cases which hold that the proper 
test for interdependence is one of independent utility.•). 
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it would clearly be •irrational, or at least unwise• to proceed 
with Phases I-III. Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1285. The 
Government could not •reasonably consider• going ahead with the 
deep water cable research and construction if there were no 
geothermal energy development to utilize the cable. Thomas, 753 
F.2d at 760. Neither would the geothermal energy be developed if 
there were no cable project to convey the power generated. See the 
1988 Act, H.R.S. S 1960-2. The facts of Thomas--timber project and 
access road--are analogous. Most significantly, there is no 
•independent utility• to the drilling of 25 commercial size wells 
to •verify• a geothermal resource (Phase III); that action is 
• irrational• absent imminent construction of a geothermal power 
plant (Phase IV). 
Accordingly, even if the Project is properly characterized as 
four separate phases, the court would hold that those four phases 
are •connected actions• under NEPA regulations, and should be the 
subject of a single EIS. 9 
B. Mootness 
Even though the actions are connected, Phases I and II have 
·already been completed. Any attempt to have those actions 
considered in a comprehensive EIS is, therefore, moot. 10 
9 Given the mootness of Phases I and II, see infra Section 
V.B, this finding of connectedness is effective only as to the 
remaining actions, Phases III and IV. 
10 Phase I was the subject of an environmental assessment (EA) 
under NEPA, the adequacy of which was challenged in Puna Speaks v. 
Edwards, 554 F.Supp. 117 (D. Haw. 1982) (finding the EA to comply 
with the statute, and refusing to compel an EIS). In order to 
compel an EIS considering all four phases, Plaintiffs should have 
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AB discussed above in Section IV, NEPA's function is to assure 
that adequate information is provided at the decision-making stage 
on a proposed action. 
(T]he basic function of an EIS is to serve as a forward-
looking instrument to assist in evaluating •proposals• 
for major federal action • • • • 
National Wildlife Fed. v. Appalachian Reg. Commission, 677 F.2d 
883, 889 (D.C.Cir. 1981) (quoting Aersten v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 
19 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 u.s. 390, 406 
n.20 (1975))) (emphasis supplied by the Appalachian court). 
Where the decision has already been made and carried out, and 
the action taken cannot be undone, there is absolutely no function 
or role for an EIS. Any suit to compel an EIS at that point is, 
perforce, moot. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1317-18 
(9th Cir. 1988) (suit challenging mining operations; the suit for 
an EIS is moot because •no adequate remedy exists • • • • [A] 
completed mining project cannot be moved,• distinguishing Columbia 
Basin Land Protection Assoc. v Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 591 n.l 
(9th Cir. 1981) (suit over placement of power lines is not moot 
since the court could order that the power line be moved)); ~ 
also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377, 1378-79 
(9th Cir. 1978) (claim is moot because the challenged mining 
project ended before the appeal was heard); Ogunquit Village Corp. 
v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 246-47 (1st Cir. 1977) (courts cannot 
challenged the adequacy of the EA for Phase I, arguing that the 
remaining three phases were •connected actions.• Plaintiffs in 
this case were not parties to the Puna Speaks action, and it does 
not appear from the opinion that any •connected action• argument 
was raised at that time. 
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provide post-completion relief under NEPA). 
Thus, whatever EIS might ultimately be ordered if Plaintiffs 
are successful in this suit can be directed only toward the 
remaining work to be done. 
[W]hen a NEPA challenge is leveled against some 
subsequent phase of a continuing federal action, the EIS 
obligation attaching at the latter point is realistically 
qualified by the elements of the program already in 
place. This limitation simply confines NEPA's mandatory 
decisionmaking input to programs posing options that may 
still freely be chosen. 
Appalachian, 677 F.2d at 890. The actions taken in Phases I and II 
are complete and cannot be made the subject of any EIS; rather 
their effects should be incorporated into the background •data 
base• for assessment of the phases still at issue. See Coalition 
on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 70 (D.C.Cir. 1987). 
c. Ripeness 
As to the remaining phases, the Government contends that there 
is no proposal yet before it, and that the suit to compel an EIS is 
therefore unripe. Coupled with this contention is the Government's 
promise that the appropriate environmental assessment will be done 
for Phase III before that project is undertaken. These 
alternative, if somewhat inconsistent, arguments will be considered 
in turn. 
1. The Proposal Requirement--Triggering the NEPA Duty 
It is now well settled that an EIS cannot be required unless 
and until a •proposal• is made. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 
390 (1975). In Kleppe, the Department of Interior was involved in 
leasing government property to be mined, and the Sierra Club sought 
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to compel an EIS for the entire region then being leased. The : 
Court of Appeals found that the Department •contemplated • a 
regionwide plan or program, even though its only activity had been 
the entering of individual leases, and ordered that an EIS be 
prepared. The Supreme Court reversed, saying that the statute does 
not require an EIS until an agency makes a report or recommendation 
on a proposal. Whether or not regionwide action was contemplated, 
there was no proposal for such regionwide action, and the EIS could 
not be compelled. See also Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 
422 u.s. 289, 320 (1974) (•[T]he time at which the agency must 
prepare the final [environmental impact] 'statement' is the time at 
which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal 
action.•) (emphasis in original); B.R.S. Land Investors v. United 
States, 596 F. 2d 353, 355 {9th Cir. 1979) (utility applied for 
federal approval for high-tower power lines over federal land; 
although there had been •preliminary discussions• on the 
application, there was no federal action sufficient to trigger 
NEPA). 
Despite its attempt to establish a bright-line test, the 
Kleppe decision does not dictate a clear conclusion in this case. 
One commentator has observed: 
The Supreme Court's decision in Kleppe leaves many 
questions unanswered. The Court stated that NEPA 
requires a •precise• decision on whether an agency has 
•proposed• an action, but it did not define •proposal.• 
. . . . 
Mandelker, NEPA Law & Lit. S 8:13 (1990). Indeed this fact pattern 
does not seem to fit within the parameters contemplated by Kleppe 
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or by any other reported decision. 
In the more typical scenario, a federal agency considers a 
private proposal, then issues a report or recommendation on it 
before the proposed action is taken. Kleppe and its progeny 
clearly establish that the EIS must be completed at the time such 
report or recommendation is made. If Congressional action is 
required, the proposal, the report or recommendation, and the EIS 
all go to Congress for consideration. 
In this case, however, the proposal was submitted directly to 
Congress, and DOE did not issue a report or recommendation on it. 
DOE's failure to issue such a report or recommendation has already 
frustrated to some degree NEPA's purposes in that Congress acted on 
the proposal without being advised or informed of its potential 
environmental impact. The Government now argues that it may use 
the appropriated funds to contract for the work comprising Phase 
III before it can be compelled to look at the environmental 
consequences of that action. 
This approach appears to be in conflict with NEPA's clear 
intent, as interpreted by the accompanying regulations: 
The [environmental impact] statement shall be prepared 
early enough so that it can serve practically as an 
important contribution to the decisionmaking process and 
will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions 
already made. 
40 CFR S 1502.5. The Ninth Circuit has joined in this refrain, 
stressing that • [t]he purpose of an EIS is to apprise 
decisionmakers of the disruptive environmental effects that may 
flow from their decisions at a time when they 'retain[] a maximum 
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range of options.'• Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th' 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1414 
(O.C.Cir. 1983)) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub nom • .sJ!n 
Exploration and Production Co. v. Lujan, 489 u.s. 1012 (1989). In 
any case, the statement •must be prepared before any irreversible 
and irretrievable commitment of resources. • Conner v. Burford, 848 
F.2d at 1446. The Ninth Circuit has further warned that •delay in 
preparing an EIS may make all parties less flexible. After major 
investment of both time and money, it is likely that more 
environmental harm will be tolerated.• Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1979). 
The decision to commit $5 million of federal funds to Phase 
III of the Project has already been made. It may be, therefore, 
that some kind of NEPA compliance--an environmental assessment or 
EIS--may in fact already be due. Nonetheless, the u.s. Supreme 
Court requires a •proposal.• 
Although Kleppe fails to define •proposal•, the regulations 
provide some assistance in this regardz 
•Proposal• exists at that stage in the development of an 
action when an agency subject to the Act has a goal and 
is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more 
alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the 
effects can be meaningfully evaluated. • • • A proposal 
may exist in fact as well as by agency declaration that 
one exists. 
40 CFR S 1508.23. This definition is plainly geared toward a more 
general, functional interpretation of the term, not the literal 
interpretation urged by the Government. 
In this case, the agency, DOE, clearly •bas a goal• of 
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implementing Phase III, and it is apparent that its ultimate goal 
is to see Phase IV through. There is evidence that the Department 
of Interior shares this goal. If DOE is, as it suggests, 
soliciting or drawing up contracts to perform the work, it • is 
actively preparing to make a decision on one or more means of 
accomplishing that goal.• The fact that DOE has not set forth any 
written •proposal• is immaterial because •a proposal may exist in 
fact as well as by agency declaration.• Id. 
The fact that Congress has already appropriated $5 million for 
Phase III clearly establishes that some kind of proposal has been 
made. In National Wildlife Fed. v. Coston, 773 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 
1985), the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
appropriations in triggering NEPA obligations. 
significance of 
The court held that 
while the appropriations themselves are not major federal action, 
Id. at 1518, they are the •fund[ing of] actions already proposed.• 
Id. at 1518 (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 362 
(1979)) (emphasis added). Because NEPA already applies to, and an 
EIS duty has already arisen for, the proposed action for which the 
appropriation is made, any EIS requirement for the appropriation 
itself would be redundant. Id. 
Based on this analysis, the $5 million appropriation was made 
to fund the •already proposed• federal action herein characterized 
as Phase III. Because a proposal must be deemed to have been made 
to secure the appropriation, the suit to compel an EIS appears to 
be, under this approach, clearly ripe. Moreover, because the money 
has been appropriated, the Government is clearly in the decision-
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making mode--that in which an EIS is required--deciding precisely 
how the money will be disbursed and/or how the action will be 
carried out. There is no risk that the EIS will ultimately prove 
unnecessary. See Kleppe, 427 u.s. at 406 (because many 
•contemplated• projects do not ever ripen into •proposals,• EISs 
for such contemplated projects would be unnecessary wastes of 
resources). This is a case in which a proposal •exist[s] in fact,• 
whether or not it has ever been formally advanced as such. 40 CFR 
s 1508.23. 
Further, there are additional grounds for finding a •proposal• 
here. Congress was not acting in a vacuum. It appropriated the 
money for Phase III in response to an extensive and detailed 
•Proposal to Establish the Hawaii Geothermal Resource Verification 
and Characterization Program, • prepared by the Hawaii Department of 
Business and Economic Development, and submitted to Congress by the 
State of Hawaii in March 1990 (the •Hawaii Proposal•). In light of 
DOE's significant role in the greater Project, this is clearly a 
•proposal• sufficient to trigger NEPA obligations. 
The Government cannot argue that this was simply a private 
proposal which it may yet dismiss without any need for an EIS. See 
Daingerfield Island Protective Society v. Andrus, 458 F.Supp. 961, 
963 (D.D.C. 1978) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that •the 
Government, prior to accepting or rejecting a private proposal 
submitted to it, must have prepared an EIS. •) • Under the 
•state/federal partnership• characterization the Project has 
received, the state's proposal might even be deemed DOE's proposal 
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as well. And even if the Hawaii Proposal could be properly termed : 
a •private proposal, • the proposal has been accepted by act of 
Congress, and has now been served into DOE's court with that formal 
federal imprimatur. 
Now that the proposal is before DOE, NEPA requires that work 
begin on the prescribed environmental assessments. 
regulations, such work must begin immediatelyz 
Under the 
An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental 
impact statement as close as possible to the time the 
agency is developing or is presented with a proposal. 
40 CFR S 1502.5 
To rule that a proposal on which Congress has already acted is 
not ripe for NEPA purposes, i.e., does not trigger NEPA 
obligations, would elevate form over substance. A proposal exists 
since •an agency subject to the Act has a goal and is actively 
preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative means of 
accomplishing that goal. • 40 CFR S 1508.23. Moreover that 
proposal has been given Congressional blessing. The time appears 
to be ripe for preparation of an EIS. 
A separate question remains, however, of whether the time is 
ripe for an action to compel an EIS. 
2. Ripeness of an Action to Compel NEPA Compliance 
At the hearing, the Government stressed that federal agencies 
are entitled to a presumption of regularity, and promised that DOE 
would take steps to comply with NEPA. Government counsel cited the 
Declaration of John E. Mock, Director of DOE's Geothermal Division: 
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l • • ,_ 
DOE is currently preparing a statement of work for 
a contract to implement the congressional language cited 
above. As yet, DOE has not contracted with the State for 
the verification or characterization work to be performed 
by the State. Prior to any verification or 
characterization work being undertaken with these funds, 
DOE will prepare or have prepared for its evaluation 
under NEPA the appropriate environmental analysis. 
Mock Declaration, t7. 
There is a certain inconsistency in the Government's position, 
however. In its briefs, and as discussed supra, the Government has 
argued that no proposal has been submitted to DOE, and that no duty 
to perform an Environmental Assessment accrues until there is both 
a proposal submitted and a report or recommendation from the agency 
on that proposal. Government counsel promised that if and when 
some "triggering• event occurs (~, a permit application), the 
applicable agency will not take action (approve the permit) without 
first jumping through the necessary NEPA hoops. 
Aside from the issue of when NEPA obligations are first 
triggered is the issue of when an agency's compliance (or 
noncompliance) with NEPA may be challenged and/or enjoined. By 
arguing that DOE should be given a chance to comply with NEPA and 
that the agency is already •in the process• of such review, the 
Government implicitly admits that NEPA obligations have been 
triggered. The Government's argument then focuses on the 
contention that its compliance cannot be challenged or enjoined 
until the time has come for that compliance to be complete. The 
Government's position is apparently that no injunction can be 
sought or issued until the money is transferred or contracts are 
entered. Until that time, the Government asserts that it is 
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entitled to a •presumption of regularity.• 
Plaintiffs contend, on the other hand, that there is nothing 
left for DOE to do in this situation except hand the money over to 
Hawaii's DBEO, and even this transfer is not in DOE's discretion. 
They argue that because no further federal approvals are necessary 
before the $5 million is used to commence work on Phase III, there 
is no date certain by which NEPA compliance must be complete and at 
which review of such compliance would be any riper than it already 
is. 
a. The Presumption of Regularity 
The best articulation of the relevant law on an agency's 
•presumption of regularity• comes from Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 
1441 (9th Cir 1988). Conner was a challenge to the sale of oil/gas 
leases in vast areas of national forest. The suit was based on the 
government's failure to prepare an EIS as required by NEPA before 
selling the leases. The court found that the leases contained •no 
surface occupancy• (•Nso•) stipulations prohibiting any surface-
disturbing activity, and therefore did not have significant 
environmental consequences. It concluded that an EIS for such 
leases could be required only upon the 
[m]odification or removal of an NSO stipulation • • • , 
which • • • would constitute an irretrievable commitment 
of resources requiring the preparation of an EIS. 
Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447-48. The court refused to anticipate such 
alteration of NSO stipulations& 
We cannot assume that government agencies will not comply 
with their NEPA obligations in later stages of 
development. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 u.s. 402, 415 (1971) (agency action entitled 
28 
l , . 
to presumption of regularity). 
~ at 1448. 11 
Conner relied on Sierra Club v. FERC, 754 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 
1985), in which a •preliminary permit• for a hydroelectric project 
had been issued without conducting an EIS. The court in Sierra 
Club ruled that because the preliminary permit did not authorize 
any activity on federal land, but functioned simply to maintain the 
applicant's priority of application for a license, no EIS could be 
required. Id. at 1509. The court observed that •[p]etitioners can 
only enter federal land and conduct ground-breaking activities 
after obtaining Forest Service and BLM special use permits.• Id. 
Because the court found that action affecting the environment could 
not take place until the permits were issued, the requirements of 
NEPA could be fully met by conducting the EIS at that later stage. 
b. Where the Agency Denies Any Duty 
In this case, however, the Government has argued that there 
is/was no proposal before DOE, and there is/was, therefore, nothing 
for DOE to act on. As discussed above, Government counsel 
suggested that NEPA obligations would be triggered if a permit were 
11 The Overton Park case was a challenge to the Secretary of 
Transportation's approval of a highway through a state park. In 
finding that the plaintiffs had submitted insufficient evidence 
that the Secretary had exceeded his authority in giving such 
approval, the U.S. Supreme Court observed: 
Certainly, the Secretary's decision is entitled to a 
presumption of regularity. But that presumption is not 
to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth 
review. 
401 u.s. at 415 (citations omitted). The Court also noted that the 
Secretary's decision could be overturned if • 'arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.•• Id. at 416 (quoting 5 u.s.c. S 706(2)(A)). 
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applied for, but refused to speculate as to what, if any, permits 
might be necessary before work on Phase III begins. 
Where the agency is arguing that it has no obligation to do 
anything under NEPA, the court cannot presume that the agency is, 
at the same time, carrying out the environmental assessments that 
NEPA requires. Any such •presumption of regularity• is waived or 
at least vitiated by the Government's contention that it has no 
NEPA duty whatsoever. 
The inquiry does not end here, however, because the Government 
does not rely solely on its denial of duty argument. 
c. The Point at Which NEPA Compliance May Be 
Reviewed, Challenged, or Compelled 
The Government has also argued that •ooE is currently 
preparing a statement of work for a contract to implement the 
congressional language• and that •the appropriate environmental 
analysis• will be done before any work on Phase III is undertaken 
with federal funds. Mock Declaration, ''· AB noted earlier, this 
argument essentially concedes that NEPA obligations have been 
triggered, and the issue shifts to the question of when the 
obligation which presently exists can be compelled. 
The •presumption of regularity• suggests that this court 
should assume that DOE will fully comply with its NEPA obligations, 
and should not interfere until the time has come for such 
compliance to be complete. At that point, the court can evaluate 
the adequacy of the compliance, and compel any actions required by 
law that have been overlooked. The Government suggests that such 
a time will not be reached in this case until contracts are entered 
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for the performance of the work contemplated by Phase III. 
Even if DOE has a role in contracting for the work in Phase 
III, however, this suit will not necessarily be unripe. The Ninth 
Circuit has held that when the agency is committed to implementing 
a project, a suit to compel NEPA compliance need not be delayed 
until the contracting stage. In Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Andrus, 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1979), the Department of Interior 
announced a program for marketing reservoir water for industrial 
uses. The court ruled that the Plaintiffs need not await the 
entering of actual contracts: 
Here the Secretary of Interior has no intention of 
abandoning plans for marketing industrial water and is 
prepared to execute water option contracts. NEPA does 
not permit delay in assessing the environmental impact of 
the marketing plan. 
Id. at 852. 12 Here 1 given the $5 million appropriation already 
made for Phase III 1 as well as the previous undertaking and 
completion of Phases I and II, the evidence may show that the 
Secretary of Energy similarly •has no intention of abandoning 
plans• to implement that Phase. In such a scenario, under Andrus, 
NEPA will not permit further delay, regardless of whether DOE will 
later be entering into contracts. See also Lathan v. Volpe, 455 
F.2d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 1971) (•If defendants' contention were 
accepted--that no environmental impact statement is required until 
the final approval stage--then it could well be too late to adjust 
12 It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit also recognized that 
each water option contract required a separate EIS. The court held 
that such •EIS(s] must be prepared prior to execution of an option 
contract.• Andrus, 596 F.2d at 852 (emphasis added). 
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the formulated · plana so as to minimize adverse environmental 
effects.•) 
There is some question, however, as to the role DOE will play 
in contracting for the Phase III work. The Congressional action 
does not authorize DOE to •contract• for that work. It simply 
provides the $5 million to the State DBEDz 
The Committee recommendation also includes $5,000,000 for 
the State of Hawaii through its [D]epartment of 
[B]usiness and [E]conomic [D]evelopment to continue the 
Hawaii geothermal resource verification and 
characterization projects to help reduce the State's 
dependency on fossil fuels. The State of Hawaii has 
assured the Committee that this cost-shared assessment 
will be conducted consistent with the State's outstanding 
effort to protect and preserve its unique natural 
resources. 
Conference Report 101-889, Oct. 16, 1990 to accompany HR 5019. 
This language suggests, and Plaintiffs argue, that Congress did not 
envision a contracting role for DOE. Rather, it provided the money 
to DBED based on assurances from the state about how the money 
would be used, apparently leaving the contracting in the state's 
hands and discretion. 
If this is the case, these facts are distinguishable from 
Conner and Sierra Club, both of which anticipated a specific future 
event, a future federal decision whether to permit the environment-
threatening project to go forward. The action already taken in 
this case, Congressional appropriation of $5 million for the 
express purpose of implementing the •already proposed• Phase III, 
may actually be sufficient for work to begin. Neither party has 
identified any kind of further approval that will be needed before 
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the work on Phase III may commence. 13 
If there is no further federal approval required, if there is 
no substantial and significant decision-making role left for DOE 
before committing itself to implementing Phase III, the suit to 
compel NEPA compliance is as ripe as it will ever be. Conner and 
Sierra Club do not control to defeat ripeness unless there is a 
future point, clearly identified, at which NEPA compliance must be 
complete and can be reviewed, challenged or compelled. Andrus 
controls to establish ripeness if that future point is the mere 
implementation of a project or program already embraced and 
adopted. 
This gives rise to a material issue of fact. The court needs 
more information on DOE's level of commitment to the implementation 
of Phase III, as well as the precise role that DOE expects to play, 
will play, and/or must play in the disbursement of the $5 million. 
If, as the conference report language suggests, DOE has little or 
no discretion, but must transfer the money directly to DBED, then 
the time is ripe to consider the adequacy of DOE's NEPA compliance. 
If, on the other hand, the disbursement of the funds is subject to 
DOE contracting, and DOE will have to prepare proposed contracts on 
which it will make recommendations, exercising a discretionary, 
decision-making role, an action to compel an EIS may be ripe only 
at that later time. 
13 The Government has suggested that further permits might be 
required, and has argued that it is at such a juncture that an EIS 
could be compelled. But when Government counsel was asked by this 
court what permits will be required or applied for, he insisted, •1 
have no idea.• 
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The presence of these material issues of fact preclude summary 
judgment as requested by the Government at this stage. Resolution 
of the issue presented will require further factual findings at 
trial. 
VI. Major Federal Action--Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summa~ 
Judgment 
The issue is raised in Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion whether the 
participation of the Government in the Project, as outlined above, 
constitutes •major federal action• as a matter of law. Plaintiffs 
have moved for summary judgment on this issue, reserving the 
remaining two issues for trial. 1• 
A. The Regulations 
The applicable regulations define •major federal action• to 
include, inter alia, •new and continuous activities, including 
projects or programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, 
conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies • • 40 • • • 
CFR S 1508.18(a). 
The Government has attempted to de-emphasize the participation 
of the various defendant agencies in the Project (stressing that 
the more significant involvement of such agencies will not come 
until Phase IV), and both parties have argued the significance, or 
insignificance, of the Interagency Group. The Government relies on 
Almond Hill School v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 768 F.2d 1030 (9th 
u The issues which would remain for trial are ( 1) whether such 
action •significantly affect[s) the quality of the human 
environment,• and (2) what is the appropriate remedy. 
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Cir. 1985) to argue that such limited participation of federal 
employees has not been sufficient to turn this local project into 
major federal action. In Almond Hill 1 California undertook a 
beetle eradication project, and put three federal government 
officials on the project's eight-member board of advisors. 
Although their salaries were paid with federal funds, these 
officials did not have a decision-making role. The Ninth Circuit 
found that the payment of salaries was not a significant enough 
commitment of federal funds to make the eradication project a 
~major federal action.• 768 F.2d at 1039. 
The Government argues that the tangential involvement of 
salaried federal officials in this case is similarly insufficient 
to make the Project a federal action. The Government is straining 
at a gnat but swallowing a camel.u In addressing the issue of the 
role of federal officials in the Project, the Government overlooks 
the near $40 million in federal funds directly contributed to the 
Project. Almond Hill is easily distinguished because i ·n that case, 
as the court emphasized, •no federal funds [were] sought by the 
state or spent on the state's beetle eradication project.• Id. 
There is no dispute as to the degree of the Government's 
financial participation in the Project. The use of federal funds, 
especially in such amounts and to such a degree (over 80\ of total 
funding) is enough standing alone to render the Project ~major 
federal action.• See, ~' State of Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 
537, 540 (9th Cir. 1979) (~Most courts agree that significant 
15 See Matthew 23:23-24 (KJV). 
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federal funding turns what would otherwise be a local project into 
a major federal action.•); Homeowners Emergency Life Prot. 
Committee v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1974) (•Inasmuch as the 
grant of federal funds unquestionably moves the activity in issue 
to the point of a federal-city partnership, the project is now a 
major federal action.•). 
No matter whether the Project is considered as a single multi-
faceted program or segmented into four separate and independent 
projects, there can be little question that it is major federal 
activity. Indeed, each of the first three phases independently has 
received sufficient federal financial funding to qualify as a major 
federal action: Phase I received $10.7 million; Phase II received 
$24 million; and Phase III has already received $5 million with two 
more installments of $5 million each likely to come. Although it 
is not apparent from the record how much, if any, federal money 
will be utilized in Phase IV, it is clear from the list compiled by 
the Interagency Group that the federal government will be heavily 
involved in a permitting role at that stage. 1' Therefore, even if 
federal financing at that stage is not significant, Phase IV will 
nonetheless qualify as major federal action because it is a 
•project[] [or] program[] entirely or partly ••• regulated, or 
approved by federal agencies.• 40 CFR S 1508.18(a). 
16 In fact, the Government defends Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion by 
arguing that most of the defendant federal agencies are not yet 
involved and will not become involved until the Project reaches the 
permitting stage in Phase IV. In so arguing, the Government 
acknowledges the important role numerous federal agencies will have 
in Phase IV. 
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The enormous commitment of federal resources to the Project 
easily establishes it as major federal action. These facts are not 
in dispute, and no facts are alleged _which, if proven, could make 
it otherwise. Further, in addition to the substantial financial 
commitment to this Project, the court has outlined above the 
Government's additional substantial involvement and participation 
at every stage of the Project's history. See Section II.C. supra. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment declaring the 
Government's involvement in the Project to be major federal action. 
VII. Conclusion 
Whereas material issues of fact remain regarding ( 1) the 
Government's, specifically DOE's, commitment to implementation of 
Phase III, and (2) OOE's role with respect to the $5 million 
appropriation, the Government's motion for summary judgment is 
DENIED. As the Government's involvement in the Project constitutes 
major federal action for purposes of NEPA, Plaintiffs' motion for 
partial summary judgment is GRANTED. 
_JAN 0 8 1991 
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, 
BLUE OCEAN PRESERVATION SOCIETY 1 SIERRA CLUB, AND GREEPEACE 
FOUNDATION V. WATKINS, ET AL.; CIVIL NO. 90-00407 DAE; ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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